Psychological Bulletin · 1980 · 287 citations · 15 references
Social SciencesPsychologySocial PsychologyDiagnostic ReasoningExperimental PsychologyForensic PsychologyCourt TestimonyEyewitness MemoryEyewitness TestimonyWitness ExaminationWitness InterviewsWitness TestimonyEyewitness Memory TestimonyEyewitness MisidentificationMistaken Eyewitness Identification
The paper challenges the criminal justice system’s assumption that eyewitness identifications are informative while nonidentifications are not, and examines cognitive factors that may lead investigators to discount nonidentifications. Using a Bayesian information‑gain model, the authors show that an identification raises the probability of guilt, a nonidentification lowers it, and that nonidentifications are more diagnostic when they occur less often than identifications. Applying the model to existing data reveals that nonidentifications are more than 1.5 times as diagnostic as identifications, and that no‑choice decisions are more informative than foil choices about a suspect’s innocence.
The criminal justice system's practice of treating eyewitness lineup identifications of suspects as highly informative while treating nonidentifications (i.e., no-choice responses or choices of foi ls) as uninformative is questioned. A Bayesian model of information gain is used to mathematically prove that (a) if an eyewitness identification of a suspect increases the probability that the suspect is the criminal, then a nonidentification must decrease the probability that the suspect is the criminal; and (b) the relative diagnosticity of identifications versus nonidentifications (regarding the probability that the suspect is the criminal) is determined by the probability of obtaining an identification versus nonidentification, with nonidentifications being more diagnostic if they are relatively less frequent than identifications. An application of the Bayesian model to previously published data suggests that greater diagnosticity for nonidentifications than identifications is more than just a theoretical possibili ty; the available data show nonidentifications to be more than one and a half times as diagnostic as identifications regarding the probability that the suspect is the criminal. A breakdown of nonidentifications into two types, eyewitness choices of a lineup foil versus no-choice decisions, suggests that the latter is more informative than the former regarding the probability that the suspect is innocent. The cognitive mechanisms that may be responsible for criminal justice investigators' discounting of nonidentifications are discussed in relation to research on human judgment.
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Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman · 1975 · 23.1K citations
On the psychology of prediction.
Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky · Psychological Review · 1973 · 6.3K citations
P. C. Wason · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · 1968 · 1.4K citations
Consequences of prejudice against the null hypothesis.
Anthony G. Greenwald · Psychological Bulletin · 1975 · 1.1K citations