Games · 2010 · 19 citations · 26 references
Social SciencesEnvironmental PolicyEnvironmental EconomicsInternational EconomicsInternational Environmental PolicyInternational Climate AgreementsInternational Environmental AgreementsInternational Environmental RegimesMultilateral Environmental AgreementsProcedural JusticeInternational Environmental CooperationInternational Environmental Treaties
The literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs) predicts a rather low number of signatories to an IEA. This is in sharp contrast to empirical evidence. As experimental economics provides some evidence for more complex human behavior, extending the theory of IEAs to a broader class of preferences is clearly promising. The present paper shows that where countries’ preferences incorporate justice and fairness there will be a strong incentive for them to choose similar abatement policies within and outside an IEA. Consequently, free-riding at the expense of the signatory states diminishes and participation in an IEA becomes a more successful strategy, so that the size of stable IEAs increases.
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1999 · 11.1K citations · Full text
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Gary E. Bolton, Axel Ockenfels · American Economic Review · 2000 · 5.5K citations
Social Norms and Economic Theory
Jon Elster · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 1989 · 2K citations · Full text