A Confutation of Convergent Realism

TLDR

The essay examines key epistemological concepts of realist philosophies of science, noting that realism uniquely avoids treating scientific success as a miracle. The author demonstrates that reference and approximate truth fail to explain realism’s aims, critiques common realist theses on inter-theoretic relations and progress, and argues that scientific history decisively refutes several naturalistic realist versions. The essay cites H.

Abstract

This essay contains a partial exploration of some key concepts associated with the epistemology of realist philosophies of science. It shows that neither reference nor approximate truth will do the explanatory jobs that realists expect of them. Equally, several widely-held realist theses about the nature of inter-theoretic relations and scientific progress are scrutinized and found wanting. Finally, it is argued that the history of science, far from confirming scientific realism, decisively confutes several extant versions of avowedly ‘naturalistic’ forms of scientific realism. The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that doesn't make the success of science a miracle. -H. Putnam (1975)