Coalition Formation in the European Parliament

TLDR

The article investigates coalition formation in the European Parliament under the cooperation procedure. It does so by analyzing a random sample of 100 roll‑call votes. The study finds that coalitions are primarily ideologically driven, with occasional national deviations, that the Left holds political initiative, that majority thresholds shape both outcomes and coalition patterns, and that coalition composition varies by subject matter, leading to an alternative interpretation of Council‑EP conflicts as ideological rather than integrationist.

Abstract

This article analyzes coalition formation within the European Parliament (EP) under the cooperation procedure through the analysis of a random sample of 100 roll call votes. The authors find that generally, coalitions form on the basis of ideology, not nationality, although they are able to identify some national groups that occasionally vote against the majority of their party group. More interestingly, they find that the political initiative within the EP belongs to the Left and that the majorities required at different stages affect not only the outcomes of votes but also the coalitions that will form. Finally, a slight variation is found in coalition building depending on the subject matter. On the basis of these findings, the authors suggest an alternative interpretation of the conflicts between the Council and EP based on an ideological conflict about more (EP) or less (Council) regulation, as opposed to more or less integration.