Magnanimity and Integrity as Military Virtues

Abstract

Abstract This article examines the role of honour as a spur to virtue. Noting the traditional division of honour into external and internal elements, the article associates the former with Aristotle's concept of ‘magnanimity’ and the latter with the modern preference for ‘integrity’. It then argues that magnanimity should indeed be considered a virtue, and that integrity should not be considered an absolute. Both magnanimity and integrity encourage other virtues, but they can also encourage vice. An ethic of honour tends to produce an excess of those virtues considered most important within a given honour group. Honour systems are not conducive to prudence. To help overcome this problem, the article suggests two solutions: first, reconsidering the virtues which are considered most important in the military, to give greater weight to respect for human life and dignity; and second, broadening the honour group whose opinion soldiers value, in order to move beyond their immediate circle of comrades to encompass more fully the civilian society which they serve.