Nuclear learning and U.S.–Soviet security regimes

TLDR

Regimes and learning concepts, developed in Liberal IR theory, have largely been applied to international political economy, while U.S.–Soviet relations are usually explained by Realist theory, yet both strands offer valuable insights. The study aims to identify how regime injunctions constrain subissues of the U.S.–Soviet security relationship and to open a research agenda by examining this relationship through the lenses of learning and regimes. The authors analyze five nuclear relationship domains—destructive power, control problems, proliferation, arms race stability, and deterrent force structure—to map varying degrees of learning and its reciprocal influence on regime development. They find that learning varies across the five nuclear domains and that it both influences and is influenced by regime development.

Abstract

The concepts of regimes and learning have been developed in the Liberal theory of international relations, but their application has been mostly in the area of international political economy. U.S.–Soviet relations are generally explained solely in terms of Realist theory. The dichotomy is unfortunate because both strands of theory have something to contribute. Although the injunctions of an overall regime do not govern the U.S.–Soviet security relationship, it is possible to identify the injunctions and constraining effects of regimes in subissues of the security relationship. In five areas of the nuclear relationship (destructive power, control problems, proliferation, arms race stability, and deterrent force structure), it is possible to identify different degrees of learning and to see how such learning affects and is affected by the development of regimes. Looking at the U.S.–Soviet security relationship in terms of learning and regimes raises new questions and opens a research agenda which helps us to think more broadly about the processes of political change in this area.