Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy, Opinion Polling, and the Possible Limits of “Crafted Talk”

Abstract

Abstract The strategy of "crafted talk" (or framing) suggests that a politician uses public opinion to anticipate the most alluring, language to convince the public to follow a politician's own preferred policy (CitationJacobs & Shapiro, 2000). This manipulatory behavior by presidents has important consequences in the realm of constructing foreign policy, especially if the policy involves military service personnel, international prestige, or foreign conflict. However, no scholar has investigated White House archival data to examine the theoretical nuances of presidential "crafting" talk when constructing arguments for foreign policy. This article examines three case studies using internal polling memoranda and focus group results concerning the Vietnam War under President Johnson, the signing of the INF Treaty with the Soviet Union under President Reagan, and the Gulf War under President Bush. In each of the three cases, public opinion places serious constraints on presidential framing of foreign policy. Implications for the effectiveness of political framing and the limits of presidential persuasion are discussed. Keywords: "crafted talk"foreign policypresidential leadershippublic opinion Notes 1. I thank an anonymous reviewer for calling this point to my attention and assisting with the literature review. 2. For instance, on the issue of the 1994 Clinton health plan, Jacobs and Shapiro argue that Clinton and his advisers discounted the opinion of most Americans (especially concerning the size and cost of the program) and attempted to move public opinion with targeted political language (from focus groups) to convince the public to accept the White House's preferred policy. In order to combine into a single theme those popular elements of the policy (universal coverage) with unpopular elements (concerns about costs and government bureaucracy), the White House decided on "Security for All" as a theme. 3. Polling data or polling memoranda presented in this project conform to a basic standard or qualification when selecting a valid document. CitationHeith (2004), in her comprehensive study of the polling memoranda sent by and to White House staffers from the Nixon to Bush administrations, defines the material she selected as containing "formal and informal memoranda, handwritten notes, pollster reports, and other various written documents." The documents collected, selected, and reported for this project followed this criterion. The document search for this project included poll and focus group results from a variety of sources. The White House Central Files in the presidential archives including and subsequent to John Kennedy are divided into two types of files: General and Executive Files. General Files were handled by lower level White House staff members and include memoranda, letters, or reports from individual citizens or "non-important" interest groups. Executive Files are similar memoranda, letters, or reports, except that these forms were from higher profile (or "important") groups such as members of Congress, former presidents, influential citizens, or members of the media, and these letters were written by or to senior White House staff. It is therefore more appropriate to view the latter files with greater concern and with more intensity because it is these files where most of the important policy decisions are made, in particular those where polling might be used to formulate policy. Papers of key individuals who served as administrative secretaries, press department officials, policy advisors, or department secretaries (especially in the area of foreign affairs) were systematically selected for review with the assumption that these individuals would be the most likely to use public opinion polling data and would have access to these data. General papers of the president were also surveyed for evidence of public opinion polling, including the White House Central Files, the White House Official Files, the President's Personal Files and the President's Secretary's Files. Specific issues, which are the subject of the case studies here, were searched in the White House Subject File. 4. A prominent disadvantage in using archival research is the possible selection bias problem. For all presidential administrations, many small but significant events, such as personal thoughts or phone calls, were not recorded (CitationHowell & Pervenier, 2001). Important and relevant documents could have been lost or discarded either by the principal author or by staffers when sorting materials (CitationHill, 1993). Also some of the materials uniquely relevant to an analysis of presidential involvement with public opinion are not yet open to the public. Similarly, even if the material has been reviewed, certain holds can be placed on the material based upon a P-5 classification (confidential advice from staff member to the president) by an archivist or based upon a restrictive "deed of gift." My approach, however, remedies this selection problem by relying on a wide range of available documents (both primary and secondary) to explain my positions and evaluate my arguments. 5. Others have successfully employed these techniques with mid-20th-century presidents (see CitationFoyle, 1999; CitationWestern, 2005a). Armed with the fertile information from the actual time of decision making, researchers can find out what the president and his staff knew and when they knew it. We can therefore identify important timing sequences to investigate how public opinion had an effect on decision making, a key consideration for testing our hypotheses and getting a fresh look at this theoretical quandary. 6. Lyndon Johnson Library, White House Central Files, PR 16 12/15/65–1/21/66, "Moyers to President," December 27, 1965, Box 346. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Lyndon Johnson Library, White House Central Files, PR 16 12/15/65–1/21/66, "Moyers to President," December 27, 1965, Box 346. 11. Lyndon Johnson Library, Aides Files (Panzer), WH Cantril, Tad, "Cantril to Redmon," September 21, 1966, Box 326. 12. Lyndon Johnson Library, White House Central Files, PR 16 12/15/65–1/21/66, "Moyers to President," December 27, 1965, Box 346. 13. Ibid. 14. Lyndon Johnson Library, Aides Files (Panzer), WH Cantril, Tad, "Cantril to Redmon," September 21, 1966, Box 326. 15. Lyndon Johnson Library, White House Central Files, PR 16 12/15/65–1/21/66, "Moyers to President," December 27, 1965, Box 346. 16. Lyndon Johnson Library, Aides Files (Panzer), Misc. Polls T-V, "Redmon to Moyers," January 12, 1966, Box 217. 17. Lyndon Johnson Library, White House Central Files, PR 16 6/23/66–8/15/66, "Redmon to Moyers," July 13, 1966, Box 347. 18. Lyndon Johnson Library, Aides Files (Panzer), Misc. Polls T-V, "Redmon to Moyers," January 12, 1966, Box 217. Redmon indicated in the memorandum that he developed these points "in talks with my new found public opinion research friends." 19. CitationHolum (1997) describes the technical aspects of the treaty: "The INF Treaty requires elimination of all LRINF missiles (ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers) by June 1, 1991, and all SRINF (ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers) missiles within 18 months. In all, 2,692 missiles are to be eliminated. In addition, all associated launchers, equipment, support facilities, and operating bases worldwide are to be eliminated or closed out from any further INF missile system activity." See also CitationHaslam (1990, pp. 164–174). 20. Ronald Reagan Library, Richard Beal Files, Public Opinion Polls, "Beal to Meese," April 3, 1981, OA 7237, Box 5 of 6. 21. Ronald Reagan Library, Michael Deaver Files, "DMI Report: A Study of National Attitudes," April 7–10, 1983, OA 7622, page 69. The full question read, "At the present time, which nation do you feel is stronger in terms of nuclear weapons … the United States … or … the Soviet Union .. or do you think they are equal in strength?" 22. Ronald Reagan Library, Michael Deaver Files, "DMI Report: A Study of National Attitudes," April 7–10, 1983, OA 7622, page 69. The full question read, "I'm going to read you two opinions about nuclear weapons. Some people favor the first option, others the second. Please tell me which one is closest to your opinion. Position A: We must build as many nuclear weapons as quickly as we can so that we won't be pushed around by the Russians anymore. Position B: Once the Soviets and the United States have about the same strength in nuclear weapons then nuclear weapons must be reduced dramatically to assure lasting peace and security." 23. Ronald Reagan Library, Richard Wirthlin Files, Wirthlin Survey [3], "Wirthlin to Meese, Baker and Deaver," April 14, 1982, OA 7318. The question was asked as follows: "Smith believes that we must immediately bring a complete halt to the nuclear arms race by negotiating with the Russians to freeze the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads and missiles. Jones believes that such a freeze would lock the United States into a position of permanent military inferiority and this would not only be disadvantageous, but dangerous, and provide the Soviets with no incentive to negotiate for what we really want—a reduction in nuclear weapons." 24. The groups each contained 4 Republicans, 3 independents, and 5 Democrats, half males and half females. Focus groups were also conducted in advance of President Reagan's trip and summit in Moscow, in Philadelphia as well (CitationCannon, 2000, p. 705). 25. Ronald Reagan Library, PR 15, 513549–528111, "Communications Focus Groups in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania," October 5, 1987, Box 20, page 2. 26. Ibid, page 4. 27. Ibid, page 9. 28. Ibid, page 8. The other summit themes tested and rejected were "Moving Toward the Promise of Peace," "Brightening the Hope for Peace," "A Step in a New Direction," "Peace through Strength and Realism," and "Little More Hope for the Human Heart." 29. Ibid, page 2. 30. Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan, "Interview With Television Network Broadcasters," December 3, 1987. 31. Ronald Reagan Library, PR 15, 513549–528111, "Communications Focus Groups in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania," October 5, 1987, Box 20, pages 6–7. Even General Secretary Gorbachev, after President Reagan repeated the "trust but verify" phrase associated with his contingency on the treaty, jovially remarked "you repeat that at every meeting" (quoted in CitationCannon, 2000, p. 696). 32. Public Papers of the President: Ronald Reagan, "Address to the Nation on the Soviet‐United States Summit Meeting," December 10, 1987. 33. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], "Ailes to Sununu and the President," February 9, 1991, CF 00473 (2 of 4). 34. The "respondent types" included were "Mainstreamers" (ages, 25–60), "Succeeders" (25–60), "Reformers" (25–60), "College Students" (18–24), and "Young Non-College" (18–24). A footnote indicated that African Americans were underrepresented by this study. 35. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], "Ailes to Sununu and the President," February 9, 1991, CF 00473 (2 of 4). 36. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], "The Persian Gulf: Viewpoint of the American People," December 1990, CF 00473 (3 of 4), Box 44. Emphasis in original. 37. Ibid, page 11. Emphasis in original. 38. Ibid, page 6. 39. Ibid, page 6. 40. Ibid, pages 7–8. 41. Public Papers of the President: George Bush. "Remarks and an Exchange With Reporters on the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait," August 5, 1990. 42. The December briefing can be found at: George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Persian Gulf Working Group, "Memorandum to Working Group," December 3, 1990, CF 00472, Box 12 (FOIA 98–0099). Compare to the January briefing at: George H. W. Bush Library, White House OCA (Will Gunn Files), Persian Gulf (2), "Gulf Strategy," December 31, 1990, OA/ID: 03922, Box 11/66 (FIOA 98–0099). 43. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], "The Persian Gulf: Viewpoint of the American People," December 1990, CF 00473 (3 of 4), Box 44, page 9. 44. Ibid, page 15. Emphasis in original. 45. Ibid, page 17. 46. Ibid, page 11. Emphasis in original. 47. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Persian Gulf Working Group (CF 00472), "Sununu to the President," no date, Box 12 (FOIA 98–0094). 48. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], "The Persian Gulf: Viewpoint of the American People," December 1990, CF 00473 (3 of 4), Box 44, page 19. Emphasis in original. 49. Ibid, page 19. 50. Ibid, page 30. Emphasis in original. 51. George H. W. Bush Library, White House Chief of Staff Files, Polling 1991 [1 of 3], "Ailes to Sununu and the President," February 9, 1991, CF 00473 (2 of 4). 52. Public Papers of the President: George Bush. "The President's News Conference on the Persian Gulf Crisis," January 9, 1991.