Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information

Abstract

This article examines the strategic pricing of duopolists in anticipation of a takeover of one by the other. In equilibrium the acquiring firm may expand its output to signal that it is a low-cost rival and thereby improve the takeover terms. If the merged firm willface potential entry, a premerger expansion of output may be necessary to deter entry and to make the merger profitable. In that case the acquiringJirm's output expansion increases industry concentration by facilitating the takeover and by deterring entry. This establishes the rationality of predatory output expansions, even when a merger or a takeover is possible and, indeed, anticipated. * A voluminous literature is devoted to exploring the role of pricing in altering industry structure to achieve monopoly power. That literature discusses both price-cutting to drive existing rivals from the industry (predatory pricing) and setting low prices to deter potential entrants (limit pricing). The former has received the lion's share of the attention of antitrust commentators and enforcers, but the rationality of predatory pricing has been seriously questioned. The major criticism has two parts: (i) takeovers are a superior means of achieving monopoly power and, where legal, should therefore be used instead of price-cutting; and (ii) if a takeover is anticipated, premerger price-cutting merely dissipates some of the value of the merging parties and would thus be irrational. The first argument was originally advanced by McGee' (1958) and later by Telser (1965) and Bork (1978). The essential idea is that since predation is costly, firms should realize that a more profitable arrangement (in the form of a merger) exists and ought to be negotiated. The second argument is a natural extension of the first. In response to this criticism Yamey (1972) provides two arguments. First, the aggressor knows that he may face other rivals in the future (entrants into this or other markets). Those potential rivals may draw inferences from his current behavior about the response they will face if they enter. In that case the aggressor may wish to develop a reputation for aggressive behavior. Second, even if a takeover is anticipated, the terms of the takeover may be affected by the pretakeover pricing.