Journal of Financial Economics · 1999 · 1.5K citations · 27 references
ManagementFinanceRisk ManagementAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceFinancial EconomicsCapital Structure DeterminantsEquity RiskFinancial RiskProject RiskRisk PreferencesRisk-return AnalysisEquity Market RiskEquity Return VolatilityFirm Financial PerformanceFirm PerformanceInvestment OpportunitiesInvestment Opportunity EffectsRisk Management IncentivesRisk-shifting Incentives
To control risk-related incentive problems, equity holders are expected to manage both the convexity and slope of the relation between firm performance and managers’ wealth. I find stock options, but not common stockholdings, significantly increase the sensitivity of CEOs’ wealth to equity risk. Cross-sectionally, this sensitivity is positively related to firms’ investment opportunities. This result is consistent with managers receiving incentives to invest in risky projects when the potential loss from underinvestment in valuable risk-increasing projects is greatest. Firms’ stock-return volatility is positively related to the convexity provided to managers, suggesting convex incentive schemes influence investing and financing decisions.
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The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities
Fischer Black, Myron S. Scholes · Journal of Political Economy · 1973 · 29.4K citations
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Stewart C. Myers · Journal of Financial Economics · 1977 · 13.4K citations
Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large
John W. Pratt · Econometrica · 1964 · 4.9K citations
Economics, Organization and Management.
Sudipto Bhattacharya, Paul Milgrom, John W. Roberts · The Journal of Finance · 1993 · 4.8K citations