On a family of paradoxes

Abstract

1. Some paradoxical statements are, on the face of it, awkward for the propounder only, while some are also awkward for the looker-on. The Eubulidean version of the Liar paradox is of the second sort-if a man says 'What I am now saying is false', not only he himself but we who look on seem forced to say contradictory things (that his statement must be true because even if it were false it would be true, and that it must be false because even if it were true it would be false). On the other hand, if Epimenides the Cretan says that nothing said by a Cretan is the case, it appears that he has landed himself in a hole, but the beholder can contemplate his position without unease, simply saying that what Epimenides says must be false because even if it were true it would be false, and so concluding that it is false without further ado.