The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe

TLDR

International human rights regimes create committees and courts to hold governments accountable, yet scholars debate whether powerful democracies impose norms (realist) or diffusion persuades less‑democratic states (ideational). The study proposes a republican liberal theory that new democracies delegate to international regimes to protect domestic democracy. The authors examine the European Convention on Human Rights as a case to test this theory. Historical evidence supports the republican liberal explanation, indicating that governments sacrifice sovereignty to stabilize democracy—a pattern that extends to other regimes.

Abstract

Most formal international human rights regimes establish international committees and courts that hold governments accountable to their own citizens for purely internal activities. Why would governments establish arrangements so invasive of domestic sovereignty? Two views dominate the literature. “Realist” theories assert that the most powerful democracies coerce or entice weaker countries to accept norms; “ideational” theories maintain that transnational processes of diffusion and persuasion socialize less-democratic governments to accept norms. Drawing on theories of rational delegation, I propose and test a third “republican liberal” view: Governments delegate self-interestedly to combat future threats to domestic democratic governance. Thus it is not mature and powerful democracies, but new and less-established democracies that will most strongly favor mandatory and enforceable human rights obligations. I test this proposition in the case of the European Convention on Human Rights—the most successful system of formal international human rights guarantees in the world today. The historical record of its founding—national positions, negotiating tactics, and confidential deliberations—confirms the republican liberal explanation. My claim that governments will sacrifice sovereignty to international regimes in order to dampen domestic political uncertainty and “lock in” more credible policies is then generalized theoretically and applied to other human rights regimes, coordination of conservative reaction, and international trade and monetary policy.