On sharing experiences

Abstract Mundy and Sigman (1989) note that a problem arises in reconciling the existence of joint-attention deficits in autism with Leslie's (1987) theory that autistic children lack an innate, late-appearing metarepresentational capacity . Such a theory fails to encompass earlier rooted and perhaps more basic manifestations of autistic children's impairments in interpersonal coordination and intersubjective communication. The account provided by Mundy and Sigman, while promising, fails to address a critical question: How is it that autistic children have limited understanding that other people are subjects of experience with whom things can be shared? 1 suggest that an answer emerges only when we pay due regard to the nature of normal and autistic interpersonal relations. Here the authors' cognitive-behavioral analysis of affective exchanges between people leaves out the heart (and much of the mind) of the matter.