Historical Emissions and Free-Riding

Axel Gosseries

Ethical Perspectives · 2004 · 184 citations · 18 references

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TL;DR

The paper investigates whether present community members should compensate victims of ancestral greenhouse‑gas emissions, arguing that neither the original polluters nor their descendants bear moral responsibility, yet exploring a free‑riding framework that may still impose compensation obligations. The author defines a trans‑generational free‑riding concept and contrasts two views of moral free‑riding, outlining how each determines the compensation required from descendants. The study finds that a properly defined moral free‑riding notion can impose compensation obligations on descendants, rejects objections to its use in justice theory, and shows how contrasting free‑riding views affect the required compensation amount.

Abstract

Should the current members of a community compensate the victims of their ancestor’s emissions of greenhouse gases? I argue that the previous generation of polluters may not have been morally responsible for the harms they caused. I also accept the view that the polluters’ descendants cannot be morally responsible for their ancestor’s harmful emissions. However, I show that, while granting this, a suitably defined notion of moral free-riding may still account for the moral obligation of the polluters’ descendants to compensate the current victims of their ancestors’ actions. A concept of trans- generational free-riding is defined. Objections to the idea of using free-riding as part of a theory of justice are rejected. Two different views of moral free-riding are contrasted, with consequences for the amount of compensation to be exigible from the polluters’ descendants. Some final considerations are devoted to the possible relevance of this free-riding-based view for other issues of historical injustice.

References

18