Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · 2013 · 75 citations · 20 references
Social SciencesBehavioral SciencesEconomicsBehavioral EconomicsGroup DynamicsSocial BehaviorBehavioral Game TheoryCooperative BehaviorEvolution Of CooperationGroup CooperationSocial CooperationSocial ExchangeAltruism EvolutionCooperation In Social DilemmasCostly CooperationDirect Benefits Of CooperationEvolution Of Social BehaviorGame-theoretic Modeling Of AltruismGroup Size DynamicsIntergroup Reciprocity
What makes money essential for the functioning of modern society? Through an experiment, we present evidence for the existence of a relevant behavioral dimension in addition to the standard theoretical arguments. Subjects faced repeated opportunities to help an anonymous counterpart who changed over time. Cooperation required trusting that help given to a stranger today would be returned by a stranger in the future. Cooperation levels declined when going from small to large groups of strangers, even if monitoring and payoffs from cooperation were invariant to group size. We then introduced intrinsically worthless tokens. Tokens endogenously became money: subjects took to reward help with a token and to demand a token in exchange for help. Subjects trusted that strangers would return help for a token. Cooperation levels remained stable as the groups grew larger. In all conditions, full cooperation was possible through a social norm of decentralized enforcement, without using tokens. This turned out to be especially demanding in large groups. Lack of trust among strangers thus made money behaviorally essential. To explain these results, we developed an evolutionary model. When behavior in society is heterogeneous, cooperation collapses without tokens. In contrast, the use of tokens makes cooperation evolutionarily stable.
20
A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
James W. Friedman · The Review of Economic Studies · 1971 · 1.8K citations
Social Norms and Community Enforcement
Michihiro Kandori · The Review of Economic Studies · 1992 · 1.6K citations