What Stops the Torture?

TLDR

The study investigates what drives governments to discontinue torture, focusing on the principal–agent dynamics between executives and those supervising and interrogating prisoners. The authors argue that liberal democratic institutions alter leaders’ likelihood to establish anti‑torture mechanisms, thereby raising the chance a state ends torture. States that use torture have a 93 % chance of continuing it next year; the likelihood of ending torture rises after violent dissent ceases, especially in states with popular suffrage and a free press, but increases veto points lower the chance of termination.

Abstract

States whose agents engage in torture in a given year have a 93% chance of continuing to torture in the following year. What leads governments to stop the use of torture? We focus on the principal–agent relationship between the executive and the individuals responsible for supervising and interrogating state prisoners. We argue that some liberal democratic institutions change the probability that leaders support the creation of institutions that discourage jailers and interrogators from engaging in torture, thus increasing the probability of a state terminating its use of torture. These relationships are strongly conditioned by the presence of violent dissent; states rarely terminate the use of torture when they face a threat. Once campaigns of violent dissent stop, however, states with popular suffrage and a free press are considerably more likely to terminate their use of torture. Also given the end of violent dissent, the greater the number of veto points in government, the lower the likelihood that a state terminates its use of torture.