Causal reasoning with forces

Phillip Wolff, Aron K. Barbey

Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · 2015 · 794 citations · 49 references

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TL;DR

Causal composition enables people to generate new causal relations by combining existing causal knowledge, and its implications for causal learning and the hierarchical structure of causal knowledge are discussed. We introduce a new computational model of causal composition, the force theory, which posits that people combine causal relations by simulating force interactions. We compare this theory with the mental model theory and the causal model theory, which explain composition via mental models and structural equations. In one experiment the force theory uniquely accounted for people’s ability to compose causal relationships from complex animations of real‑world events, and in three additional experiments it performed as well as or better than the mental model and causal model theories in explaining compositions derived from linguistically presented causal relations.

Abstract

Causal composition allows people to generate new causal relations by combining existing causal knowledge. We introduce a new computational model of such reasoning, the force theory, which holds that people compose causal relations by simulating the processes that join forces in the world, and compare this theory with the mental model theory (Khemlani et al., 2014) and the causal model theory (Sloman et al., 2009), which explain causal composition on the basis of mental models and structural equations, respectively. In one experiment, the force theory was uniquely able to account for people's ability to compose causal relationships from complex animations of real-world events. In three additional experiments, the force theory did as well as or better than the other two theories in explaining the causal compositions people generated from linguistically presented causal relations. Implications for causal learning and the hierarchical structure of causal knowledge are discussed.

References

49