An opponent-process theory of motivation: I. Temporal dynamics of affect.

TLDR

The theory assumes that many hedonic, affective, or emotional states are automatically opposed by central nervous system mechanisms that reduce the intensity of both pleasant and aversive feelings. The paper introduces an opponent‑process theory of motivation, outlining its applications to addiction and aversion and proposing new research directions. The model posits that opponent processes for hedonic states are strengthened by use, weakened by disuse, and interact with conditioning mechanisms. The theory explains many established facts about acquired motivation, shows that some forms are nonassociative, and reinterprets data from both pleasurable and aversive stimuli within its framework.

Abstract

A new theory of motivation is described along with its applications to addiction and aversion. The theory assumes that many hedonic, affective, or emotional states are automatically opposed by central nervous system mechanisms which reduce the intensity of hedonic feelings, both pleasant and aversive. The opponent processes for most hedonic states are strengthened by use and are weakened by disuse. These simple assumptions lead to deductions of many known facts about acquired motivation. In addition, the theory suggests several new lines of research on motivation. It argues that the establishment of some types of acquired motivation does not depend on conditioning and is nonassociative in nature. The relationships between conditioning processes and postulated opponent processes are discussed. Finally, it is argued that the data on several types of acquired motivation, arising from either pleasurable or aversive stimulation, can be fruitfully reorganized and understood within the framework provided by the opponent-process model.