2012 · 546 citations · 8 references
ComputingComputer ScienceCybersecurityAuthenticationComputer SecurityCryptographyCryptographic ProtocolsPayment SecurityPayment SystemsSecure Multi-party ComputationSecurity In Online RetailSecurity Protocol VerificationCryptocurrency Payment SystemsCurrency AuthenticationOnline Payment SecurityPayment AuthenticationProof Of WorkSecure Payment SystemsSecurity ProofsSoftware-based Payment Security
Bitcoin, a decentralized PoW‑based payment system, is increasingly used for fast payments but requires tens of minutes to verify transactions, making it unsuitable for such scenarios and leaving its security unstudied. In this paper, we analyze the security of using Bitcoin for fast payments. We propose and implement a modification to Bitcoin that ensures detection of double‑spending attacks on fast payments. Our results show that without integrated detection, double‑spending attacks on fast Bitcoin payments succeed with overwhelming probability and low cost, and that even recommended measures are insufficient to prevent such attacks.
Bitcoin is a decentralized payment system that relies on Proof-of-Work (PoW) to verify payments. Nowadays, Bitcoin is increasingly used in a number of fast payment scenarios, where the time between the exchange of currency and goods is short (in the order of few seconds). While the Bitcoin payment verification scheme is designed to prevent double-spending, our results show that the system requires tens of minutes to verify a transaction and is therefore inappropriate for fast payments. An example of this use of Bitcoin was recently reported in the media: Bitcoins were used as a form of \emph{fast} payment in a local fast-food restaurant. Until now, the security of fast Bitcoin payments has not been studied. In this paper, we analyze the security of using Bitcoin for fast payments. We show that, unless appropriate detection techniques are integrated in the current Bitcoin implementation, double-spending attacks on fast payments succeed with overwhelming probability and can be mounted at low cost. We further show that the measures recommended by Bitcoin developers for the use of Bitcoin in fast payments are not always effective in detecting double-spending; we show that if those recommendations are integrated in future Bitcoin implementations, double-spending attacks on Bitcoin will still be possible. Finally, we propose and implement a modification to the existing Bitcoin implementation that ensures the detection of double-spending attacks against fast payments.
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