The Relationship Between Civil Servants and Politicians in a Post‐Communist Country: A Case of Slovenia

Abstract

In modern democracies, civil servants have outgrown their classic role as implementors of the orders given by politicians as their masters. They now play an increasingly important role in the exercising of authority – a role which depends to a great degree on politicians themselves. Based on classical politico‐administrative divisions, the main hypothesis of this paper is to claim that, in the case of the post‐communist country of Slovenia, politicians are in charge of policy‐making and possess a dominant role over high‐ranking civil servants, who are mere implementors of policy. To verify this hypothesis, we use several mutually complementary methods and techniques, among them detailed empirical research. We find that the relationship between members of Slovenia's administrative and political elite does show competitive traits, but the conflict between the two groups is not such that would lead to a win‐lose situation. Both high‐ranking civil servants and politicians do in fact have a role as important and irreplaceable actors in the policy‐making process.