Philosophical Psychology · 2003 · 27 citations · 16 references
Social SciencesBehavioral SciencesPsychologyCognitive PsychologyPhilosophy Of MindSelfConsciousnessSelf-awarenessTheory Of MindMotivated Self-viewSelf-perception TheoryUnconsciousness Of Self
This paper argues that self-deception cannot be explained without employing a depthpsychological ("psychodynamic") notion of the unconscious, and therefore that mainstream academic psychology must make space for such approaches.The paper begins by explicating the notion of a dynamic unconscious.Then a brief account is given of the "paradoxes" of self-deception.It is shown that a depth-psychological self of parts and subceptive agency removes any such paradoxes.Next, several competing accounts of self-deception are considered: an attentional account, a constructivist account, and a neo-Sartrean account.Such accounts are shown to face a general dilemma: either they are able only to explain unmotivated errors of self-perception-in which case they are inadequate for their intended purpose-or they are able to explain motivated self-deception, but do so only by being instantiation mechanisms for depth-psychological processes.The major challenge to this argument comes from the claim that self-deception has a "logic" different to other-deception-the position of Alfred Mele.In an extended discussion it is shown that any such account is explanatorily adequate only for some cases of self-deception-not by any means all.Concluding remarks leave open to further empirical work the scope and importance of depth-psychological approaches.
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