Routine, Reflexivity, and Realism

Margaret S. Archer

Sociological Theory · 2010 · 351 citations · 38 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Routine action remains central in social theory, with scholars defending Bourdieu's habitus while also recognizing reflexivity's importance. The article examines three approaches—empirical combination, hybridization, and ontological/theoretical reconciliation—to reconcile routine action and reflexivity, finding none analytically successful. Empirical evidence shows habitus lost relevance late in the 20th century due to structural changes, rendering habitual forms inadequate for guiding lives and making reflexivity essential, while even reproducing natal background is now a reflexive process increasingly difficult to sustain.

Abstract

Many scholars continue to accord routine action a central role in social theory and defend the continuing relevance of Bourdieu's habitus. Simultaneously, most recognize the importance of reflexivity. In this article, I consider three versions of the effort to render these concepts compatible, which I term “empirical combination,” “hybridization,” and “ontological and theoretical reconciliation.” None of the efforts is ultimately successful in analytical terms. Moreover, I argue on empirical grounds that the relevance of habitus began to decrease toward the end of the 20th century, given major changes in the structures of the advanced capitalist democracies. In these circumstances, habitual forms prove incapable of providing guidelines for people's lives and, thus, make reflexivity imperative. I conclude by arguing that even the reproduction of natal background is a reflexive activity today and that the mode most favorable to producing it—what I call “communicative reflexivity”—is becoming harder to sustain.

References

38