Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation

TLDR

The study examines the interaction between crime and collective law enforcement. The authors develop and test a theory of participation in illegitimate activities using state‑level crime data. The theory derives theorems and behavioral implications via a state preference approach to behavior under uncertainty. The results show that law‑enforcement activity deters all crimes, income inequality is strongly positively correlated with property crimes, and provide tentative estimates of law‑enforcement effectiveness in reducing crime and social losses.

Abstract

A theory of participation in illegitimate activities is developed and tested against data on variations in index crimes across states in the United States. Theorems and behavioral implications are derived using the state preference approach to behavior under uncertainty. The investigation deals directly with the interaction between offense and defense: crime and collective law enforcement. It indicates the existence of a deterrent effect of law-enforcement activity on all crimes and a strong positive correlation between income inequality and crimes against property. The empirical results also provide some tentative estimates of the effectiveness of law enforcement in reducing crime and the resulting social losses.