Sanctions on Iran: Defining and Enabling ‘Success’

Abstract

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Notes For the text of all five resolutions see Resolution 1737, adopted 23 December 2006, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1737-2006.pdf; Resolution 1747, adopted 24 March 2007, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1747-2007.pdf; Resolution 1803, adopted 3 March 2008, http://www.isisnucleariran.org/assets/pdf/unsc_res1803.pdf; Resolution 1835, adopted 27 September 2008, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1835-2008.pdf; and Resolution 1929, adopted 9 June 2010, http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/unsc_res1929-2010.pdf. See 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran', Report by the Director General, IAEA, GOV/2011/2, 24 May 2011, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-29.pdf; and David Albright, Andrea Stricker and Christina Walrond, 'ISIS Analysis of May 24, 2011 IAEA Safeguards Report on Iran (Revised May 25)', ISIS Reports, 24 May 2011, http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/ISIS_Analysis_IAEA_Report_24May2011_Revised.pdf. Panel of Experts Established Pursuant to Resolution 1929, 'Final Report', Paragraph 88 and Table 1. The report has not been officially released because of opposition by Russia to some of its conclusions, but is available at http://www.innercitypress.com/1929r051711.pdf. Ibid., paragraph 4. Yossi Melman, 'Outgoing Mossad Chief: Iran Won't Have Nuclear Capability Before 2015', Haaretz, 7 January 2011, http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/outgoing-mossad-chief-iranwon-t-have-nuclear-capabilitybefore-2015-1.335656; and Mark Landler, 'US Says Sanctions Hurt Iran Nuclear Program', New York Times, 10 January 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/world/middleeast/11diplo.html. Jay Deshmukh, 'Iran Admits Sanctions "May Slow Down" Nuclear Work', AFP, 7 July 2010. Panel of Experts, 'Final Report', paragraphs 71–73, 126. Interview with senior Western government official, July 2011. Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Anna Fifield and Leslie Hook, 'China and Iran Plan Oil Barter', Financial Times, 24 July 2011; Cho Mee-young and Yoo Choonsik, 'Sanctions Trap Billions of Iran Petrodollars in Korea', Reuters, 3 August 2011; Pratish Narayanan, 'Iran Gets $1.4 Billion From India to Pay for Crude, Fars Says', Bloomberg, 8 August 2011, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-08/iran-gets-1-4-billion-from-india-topay-for-crude-fars-says.html. 'Economic Jihad', Economist, 23 June 2011; 'Inflation Hits 15.4% in Iran', Mehr News, 20 July 2011. 'Sanctions Benefit IRGC, Karroubi Says', UPI, 12 July 2011, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/07/12/Sanctionsbenefit-IRGC-Karroubi-says/UPI-77431278950917/. See Iran entry in the 2011 Index of Economic Freedom, The Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/index/Country/Iran. Tom Arnold, 'Iran Sanctions Leave Dubai Out in the Cold', The National, 4 July 2011; 'Bahrain Traders call for Boycott of Iran Trade', AFP, 3 May 2011. Karim Sadjadpour describes the practice as follows: 'Customers give a sum of money to a hawala broker (known as a hawaladar) in one city, to be transferred to a recipient in another, usually foreign, city. The hawaladar in the sender's city then calls another hawaladar in the recipient's city in order to provide the cash (minus the standard 2 percent commission) to the intended recipient. There is often no physical or even electronic transfer of money. The hawaladar who made the payment is reimbursed when the funds flow in the reverse direction, sometimes within minutes.' Karim Sadjadpour, 'The Battle of Dubai: The United Arab Emirates and the U.S.–Iran Cold War', Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 2011, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/dubai_iran.pdf. IAEA, 'Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran', GOV/2011/29, 24 May 2011, paragraph 35. However, the US intelligence community apparently continues to hold to its 2007 assessment that in 2003 Iran suspended direct work on nuclear-weapons development. Additional informationNotes on contributorsDina EsfandiaryDina Esfandiary is a Research Analyst and Project Coordinator within the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme.Mark FitzpatrickMark Fitzpatrick is Director of the IISS Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Programme and Editor of the recently published IISS Strategic Dossier North Korean Security Challenges: A net assessment.