Personal Influence, Collective Rationality, and Mass Political Action

Steven E. Finkel, Edward N. Muller, Karl‐Dieter Opp

American Political Science Review · 1989 · 386 citations · 28 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The models address the free‑rider problem that conventional rational choice theory leaves unresolved. The study proposes two models—personal influence and collective rationality—to explain participation in collective political action and discusses their implications for grievance and rational choice theories. The models are tested on legal and illegal protest behaviors using data from a national sample and two German protest‑prone community samples. The personal influence model is supported for both legal and illegal protest, whereas the collective rationality model is supported only for legal protest.

Abstract

We propose two models to explain why individuals participate in collective political action—a personal influence model and a collective rationality model. Each model overcomes the free-rider problem posed by conventional rational choice theory and left unresolved in previous research. The models are tested for legal and illegal protest behaviors, using data from a national sample and two samples of protest-prone communities in the Federal Republic of Germany. The personal influence model is supported for both forms of participation, while the collective rationality model is supported for legal protest. We discuss implications of the results for grievance and rational choice theories of collective political action.

References

28