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The dialogic unconscious: Psychoanalysis, discursive psychology and the nature of repression
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1997
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Discursive InteractionTurn-takingLinguisticsDiscursive PsychologyDiscourse AnalysisConversation AnalysisLanguage StudiesPsychoanalytic TheoryArtsPoliteness TheoryPsychodynamicPsychoanalytic PsychotherapySocial CognitionPsychologySpeech CommunicationVerbal InteractionPhilosophical Psychology
Discursive psychology, grounded in Wittgensteinian and conversation analytic traditions, focuses on the social and discursive constitution of psychological phenomena, whereas psychoanalytic theory traditionally emphasizes inner motivations, making the two approaches appear incompatible at first sight. This paper investigates possible links between discursive psychology and psychoanalytic theory by introducing the notion of a dialogic unconscious. The dialogic unconscious is defined as a discursive process by which repression can be studied through conversational interaction. The dialogic unconscious framework demonstrates that conversational interaction can have repressive functions, that discursive psychology has overlooked this dimension, and that repression is routinely achieved through discursive devices such as politeness norms, implying that repression itself is a dialogic process with implications for both discursive psychology and psychoanalytic theory.
This paper explores possible links between discursive psychology and psychoanalytic theory. At first sight, the two approaches would seem to be incompatible. Discursive psychology, in keeping with its Wittgensteinian and conversation analytic background, concentrates upon the social and discursive constitution of psychological phenomena rather than on supposed inner motivations. However, the notion of the ‘dialogic unconscious’ is introduced in order to suggest how processes of repression can be studied discursively. The argument for the dialogic unconscious suggests that conversational interaction can have repressive functions, as well as expressive ones. It is suggested that discursive psychology has tended to overlook this repressive dimension, concentrating upon the presences rather than absences in discourse. However, the conversational devices, which conversation analysts have revealed to be vital for politeness and everyday morality, can also be seen to repress the temptation of rudeness. That being so, repression can be observed to be routinely accomplished by discursive interaction. Moreover, the notion of the dialogic unconscious not only suggests that dialogue can be repressive, but also that repression is itself a dialogic, or discursive, process. The implications for both discursive psychology and Freudian psychoanalytic theory are discussed.