Interventionism and Causal Exclusion

TLDR

Recent writers argue that an interventionist treatment of causation can illuminate causal exclusion arguments, though it has faced criticism. This paper responds to these criticisms. It proposes an interventionist framework for analyzing causal relationships in the presence of supervenience relations. The framework shows that standard causal exclusion arguments rely on mistaken assumptions about what should be controlled or held fixed, and it captures how properties that supervene on but are not identical with realizing properties can be causally efficacious.

Abstract

A number of writers, myself included, have recently argued that an “interventionist” treatment of causation of the sort defended in Woodward, 2003 can be used to cast light on so‐called “causal exclusion” arguments. This interventionist treatment of causal exclusion has in turn been criticized by other philosophers. This paper responds to these criticisms. It describes an interventionist framework for thinking about causal relationships when supervenience relations are present. I contend that this framework helps us to see that standard arguments for causal exclusion involve mistaken assumptions about what it is appropriate to control for or hold fixed in assessing causal claims. The framework also provides a natural way of capturing the idea that properties that supervene on but that are not identical with realizing properties can be causally efficacious.