New constitutionalism, democratisation and global political economy∗

TLDR

Constitutional revision in the 1990s, aimed at locking in neo‑liberal reforms, secures investor freedoms and property rights for transnational enterprises, yet scholars of international political economy have largely overlooked these constitutional dimensions, as illustrated by the World Bank’s 1997 World Development Report. This essay analyzes the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neo‑liberalism, the governance discourse shaping this pattern of change. New constitutionalism confers privileged citizenship and representation rights to corporate capital and large investors. The resulting state forms exhibit a pattern of authority where capital holds greater weight and representation, restraining democratic processes that have historically struggled for representation—a contested and contradictory development.

Abstract

Constitutional revision is a feature of the 1990s. Specifically, this involves initiatives to politically 'lock in' neo‐liberal reforms. These initiatives serve to secure investor freedoms and property rights for transnational enterprises. Yet students of international political economy have paid surprisingly little attention to the constitutional aspects of global restructuring. Thus this essay analyses the new constitutionalism of disciplinary neo‐liberalism, understood as the discourse of governance that informs this pattern of change. It is reflected in the World Bank's World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. New constitutionalism operates to confer privileged rights of citizenship and representation to corporate capital and large investors. What is emerging within state forms (state & endash civil society complexes) is a pattern of authority in which capital has greater weight and representation, restraining the democratisation process that has involved centuries of struggle for representation—a development that is contested and contradictory.