Real Estate Economics · 2009 · 186 citations · 47 references
BusinessCorporate GovernanceReal EstateAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceReal Estate InvestmentCorporate Governance MechanismsReal Estate Investment TrustsReturn AnalysisAgency Problems In FinancingCorporate Governance RatingsDeterminants Of Firm ValueFirm Value EffectsReal Estate Investment Trusts (Reits)Reit Corporate GovernanceReit Operating PerformanceReit Performance Measurement
Real estate investment trusts (REITs) offer a natural experiment in corporate governance due to the fact that they leave little free cash flow for management, which reduces agency problems. We exploit a unique and leading corporate governance database to test whether corporate governance matters for the performance of U.S. REITs. We document for a sample including governance ratings of more than 220 REITs that firm value is significantly related to firm-level governance for REITs with low payout ratios only. Repeating the analysis with the complete database that includes more than 5,000 companies and a control sample of firms with high corporate real estate ratios, we find a strong and significantly positive relation between our governance index and several performance variables, indicating that the partial lack of a relation between governance and performance in the real estate sector might be explained by a REIT effect.
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