Econstor (Econstor) · 1997 · 414 citations · 17 references
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Social SciencesEconomicsInternational RelationsInternational Political EconomyInternational TradePolitical EconomyInternational CooperationTrade LiberalizationTrade PolicyTrade PoliticsBilateral Trade LiberalizationComparative Economic AnalysisFactor EndowmentsMultilateral Trade LiberalizationPolitical Support For RedistributionReservation UtilityTrade Liberalization Under Political Economy Constraints
The authors argue that when a bilateral agreement yields large gains for key domestic agents, their reservation utility rises above the multilateral level, thereby blocking a multilateral agreement. The study shows that bilateral free‑trade agreements can undermine or even eliminate political support for further multilateral trade liberalization, particularly when the countries involved share similar factor endowments. © 1997 American Economic Association.
This paper demonstrates that bilateral free-trade agreements can undermine political support for further multilateral trade liberalization. If a bilateral trade agreement offers disproportionately large gains to key agents in a country, then their reservation utility is raised above the multilateral free-trade level, and a multilateral agreement would be blocked. Bilateral agreements between countries with similar factor endowments are most likely to have this effect. It also follows that bilateral free-trade agreements can never increase political support for multilateral free trade. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.
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