A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements

Philip I. Levy

Econstor (Econstor) · 1997 · 414 citations · 17 references

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The authors argue that when a bilateral agreement yields large gains for key domestic agents, their reservation utility rises above the multilateral level, thereby blocking a multilateral agreement. The study shows that bilateral free‑trade agreements can undermine or even eliminate political support for further multilateral trade liberalization, particularly when the countries involved share similar factor endowments. © 1997 American Economic Association.

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that bilateral free-trade agreements can undermine political support for further multilateral trade liberalization. If a bilateral trade agreement offers disproportionately large gains to key agents in a country, then their reservation utility is raised above the multilateral free-trade level, and a multilateral agreement would be blocked. Bilateral agreements between countries with similar factor endowments are most likely to have this effect. It also follows that bilateral free-trade agreements can never increase political support for multilateral free trade. Copyright 1997 by American Economic Association.

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