The shadows of Cold War over Latin America: the US reaction to Fidel Castro's nationalism, 1956–59

Abstract

Scholars have addressed the problem of the Dwight Eisenhower administration's opposition to Fidel Castro's nationalist insurrection (1956–59) following two main perspectives. Some authors have perceived it in terms of a response to the threat that Castro's radical programme posed to American economic interests in Cuba. Other scholars have claimed that, in the 1950s, Washington did not have a clear perception of the differences between progressive nationalism and communism. This article offers a different explanation. It argues that the intersection between the Cold War and the decolonisation process played a crucial role in changing the US's perception of Latin American nationalism. Specifically, the launch of the Peaceful Coexistence strategy by the Soviet post-Stalinist leadership increased Moscow's ability to interact with nationalism of developing areas, pushing the Republican administration into a defensive position in the Third World. During the 1950s, this context strongly influenced Washington's diplomatic strategy in the Latin American and the Cuban scenarios, driving the Eisenhower Presidency to adopt a hostile position toward nationalist governments or nationalist inspired political movements such as Castro's.