Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content

Nigel J. T. Thomas

Cognitive Science · 1999 · 285 citations · 145 references

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Concepts

TL;DR

The current mental‑imagery literature comprises quasi‑pictorial, descriptive, and perceptual‑activity models, but the first two suffer from theoretical and empirical shortcomings, whereas the perceptual‑activity theory—though underdeveloped—offers a promising, non‑symbolic, situated‑cognition compatible framework that addresses key aspects of imagination such as non‑discursiveness, creativity, and seeing‑as. The study investigates whether cognitive‑science theories of mental imagery can illuminate the concept of imagination. The authors develop and clarify the perceptual‑activity theory, demonstrating its suitability as a foundation for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought.

Abstract

Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi‐pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the “traditional” symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent situated cognition and active vision approaches in robotics. This theory is developed and elucidated. Three related key aspects of imagination (non‐discursiveness, creativity, and seeing as) raise difficulties for the other theories. Perceptual activity theory presents imagery as non‐discursive and relates it closely to seeing as. It is thus well placed to be the basis for a general theory of imagination and its role in creative thought.

References

145