To Martyr or Not to Martyr: Jihad is the Question, What Policy is the Answer?

Abstract

Abstract The question of what policies may deter risk-taking actors who willingly commit suicide is not only theoretically challenging, but also of major importance to policymakers. Traditional deterrence theory, which is largely state-oriented, but has also delved into the realm of ordinary criminality, has not been adequately prepared to deal with individual or non-state actors who seem “irrational” because of their high propensity for risk taking and cost bearing. The present article seeks to adapt the notions of deterrence and risk taking developed in the context of interstate relations to such actors, especially terrorist groups whose members engage in martyr-style operations. First, a brief, non-technical review of the essentials of the rational choice approach to deterrence is provided. Second, the article indicates how this approach can be adapted to the deterrence of terrorist actions, especially the crucial role of risk and its correlate, uncertainty, on decision making. Finally, by way of examples, it suggests how these theoretical findings can contribute to a better understanding of the deterrence of terrorists’ actions. Perhaps the most important conclusion reached is that no policy is best, although some policies appear to be more efficacious than others. Although this is not an unexpected conclusion, the present analysis puts it on a firmer theoretical foundation and reinforces the argument that the focus of debate, discussion, and policy should be on the prospects for containing or reducing terrorist actions via passive defenses and the denial to terrorists of access to potential targets. Notes ∗Indicates indifference between outcomes. 1. Arrow (Citation1951, Citation1963); CitationBorch (1968); CitationChipman (1960); CitationDebreu (1958); CitationFishburn (1970); CitationLuce and Raiffa (1957); CitationRiker and Ordeshook (1973); Citationvon Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). 2. We do not investigate the implications of alternate and reasonable decision rules (e.g., lexicographic, minimax regret). Moreover, the expected utility decision rule rests on some additional assumptions about the nature of the “decision space” which a decision maker perceives. If these assumptions are inappropriate, then the traditional approach to rational decision making, including our analysis, does not necessarily apply (CitationDutter 1981; CitationGoertz 2004). The exploration of these possibilities, however, lies far beyond the scope of the present article. 3. Some of these preference orderings may seem unusual. For example, consider ordering IV, which indicates that in terrorists’ evaluation of outcomes, while S is the most preferred, a failed attempt (i.e., F) at action, or even a partial success, is preferred to SQ. 4. There is sometimes confusion on this point in traditional approaches to deterrence decision making due to the subtle relationship between risk and uncertainty. As noted, risk means that one or more of the relevant probabilities are perceived to be less than unity. Uncertainty refers either to how much less than unity a particular probability is perceived to be or to the size of the estimated range of values in which this probability is perceived to fall. It is this latter form of uncertainty that has received comparatively less attention in theoretical treatments of deterrence. Also, given their context dependency, decision makers’ attitudes toward risk can be assumed to be a separate consideration and can not be taken as a constant across decision situations. In other words, the same individual may be risk acceptant, neutral, or averse in different decision situations (CitationGeorge and Smoke 1974). 5. For example, one old-school, Catholic nationalist remarked that, even if there were a united Ireland tomorrow, some Catholics would still want to “put the boot in” vis-à-vis the British government and Northern Irish Protestants (CitationDutter 1980).