Comparing Proportional Representation Electoral Systems: Quotas, Thresholds, Paradoxes and Majorities

Michael Gallagher

British Journal of Political Science · 1992 · 315 citations · 24 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Electoral systems are examined across multiple dimensions, with seat allocation methods grouped into largest‑remainders and highest‑averages types, and PR methods ranked by bias toward larger or smaller parties, while the single transferable vote exhibits distinct characteristics. The study focuses on quota, thresholds, paradoxes, and majority‑seat conditions to compare seat allocation methods. Comparisons are drawn by analyzing these elements across the different allocation methods. The study finds that some methods labeled as PR are not truly proportional, and that no clear ordering exists because larger‑party‑favored methods can sometimes set lower representation thresholds than smaller‑party‑favored ones.

Abstract

The relationship between electoral systems can be examined on a number of dimensions. Seat allocation methods are conveniently divided into two groups: those based on largest remainders and those based on highest averages. The single transferable vote has its own distinct characteristics. Focusing on certain elements – the quota, thresholds, paradoxes and the conditions under which a majority of seats can be won – enables comparisons to be drawn between seat allocation methods. Certain seat allocation methods conventionally seen as variants of proportional representation (PR) cannot be regarded as such. PR methods can be rank ordered according to whether, when complete proportionality is not attainable, they display electoral bias towards larger or smaller parties. However, a definitive ordering is elusive, since some methods that are generally more favourable to larger parties can in some circumstances set lower thresholds of representation than methods generally favourable to smaller parties.

References

24