The Review of Economics and Statistics · 1998 · 322 citations · 18 references
Public AffairsCorporate GovernanceRegulatory PolicyEnvironmental RegulationRegulatory ComplianceRegulatory EconomicsEnvironmental ReportingPollution Control EnforcementPollution ReportingRegulationRegulatory EnforcementRegulatory InspectionCorporate Pollution DisclosureMonitoring IncentivesPeer Group InfluenceRegulatory Compliance InspectionRegulatory Enforcement EffectsRegulatory ScrutinySelf-reporting IncentivesSelf-reporting Regimes
The paper empirically examines how targeting influences regulatory compliance and proposes that firms use self‑reporting to signal cooperation. The study targets firms most likely to violate regulations, using inspections and self‑reporting to assess compliance. Results show a one‑quarter penalty period after a violation, that inspections are influenced by local economic conditions, and that detected violations promote self‑reporting, indicating firms cooperate with regulators.
Targeting is the practice of inspecting firms most likely to violate a regulation. This paper provides empirical evidence on the role of targeting in regulatory compliance. I propose that self-reporting by a firm is used to demonstrate that firms are willing to cooperate. The results indicate that there is a one-quarter penalty period following a violation. Inspections are also determined by the economic situation of the surrounding community, demonstrating that targeting opens the door to interest-group influence. Inspections that detect violations encourage self-reporting, showing that firms demonstrate their desire to cooperate with regulators by disclosing violations.
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Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach
Gary S. Becker · Journal of Political Economy · 1968 · 13.3K citations