Are philosophers expert intuiters?

TLDR

Experimental philosophy has challenged philosophers’ reliance on armchair intuitions, prompting the expertise defense that philosophers are highly trained experts unlike ordinary undergraduates. The study aims to test the empirical claim that philosophers’ training protects them from the same intuitive errors as ordinary participants. To evaluate this claim, the authors review psychological expertise literature and examine three hypotheses—conceptual schemata, mastery of entrenched theories, and practical know-how with hypotheticals—about what constitutes philosophical expertise. Their review finds no hypothesis convincingly supports the premise that philosophical training safeguards against intuitive mistakes.

Abstract

Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers' training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people are not generally very good at reckoning who will develop expertise under what circumstances. We consider three promising hypotheses concerning what philosophical expertise might consist in: (i) better conceptual schemata; (ii) mastery of entrenched theories; and (iii) general practical know-how with the entertaining of hypotheticals. On inspection, none seem to provide us with good reason to endorse this key empirical premise of the expertise defense.