Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and VerbalDisputes

Abstract

Logical pluralism has been in vogue since JC Beall and Greg Restall 2006 articulated and defended a new pluralist thesis. Recent criticisms such as Priest 2006a Priest, Graham. 2006a. Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar] and Field 2009 Field, Hartry. 2009. Pluralism in Logic. Review of Symbolic Logic, 2/2: 342–59. doi:10.1017/S1755020309090182[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] have suggested that there is a relationship between their type of logical pluralism and the meaning-variance thesis for logic. This is the claim, often associated with Quine 1970 Quine, W. V. O. 1970. Philosophy of Logic, Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Google Scholar], that a change of logic entails a change of meaning. Here we explore the connection between logical pluralism and meaning-variance, both in general and for Beall and Restall's theory specifically. We argue that contrary to what Beall and Restall claim, their type of pluralism is wedded to meaning-variance. We then develop an alternative form of logical pluralism that circumvents at least some forms of meaning-variance.