Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work

TLDR

Analysts often assume that common‑pool resource users cannot self‑govern, leading to government takeover, yet empirical evidence shows that appropriators can create and enforce effective rules. This study seeks to identify the conditions that strengthen or weaken self‑governance in irrigation systems with asymmetric users by analyzing head‑end and tail‑end farmer interactions over maintenance and bargaining, and by reviewing empirical evidence from Nepal. The authors examine how head‑end and tail‑end farmers decide on irrigation upkeep and negotiate, using a framework that highlights the asymmetry between those near and far from the water source. Empirical data from Nepal demonstrate that self‑governed irrigation systems can function effectively, showing that asymmetric users can cooperate and that the identified conditions promote successful self‑organization.

Abstract

Many analysts presume that the appropriators of a common-pool resource are trapped in a Hobbesian state of nature and cannot themselves create rules to counteract the perverse incentives they face in managing the resource. The logical consequence of this view is to recommend that an external authority—"the" government—take over the commons. But considerable empirical evidence from field and experimental settings holds that appropriators frequently do constitute and enforce their own rules, and that these rules work. Our research agenda is to develop a coherent understanding of the set of conditions that enhance or detract from self-organizing capabilities when individuals differ substantially from one another. For the sake of concreteness, this paper focuses on the asymmetry present in most irrigation systems between those who are physically near the source of water (the head-enders) and those who are physically distant from it (the tail-enders). This paper first explores the interaction between head-end and tail-end farmers, particularly their decisions about whether to devote resources to the upkeep of the irrigation system, and how bargaining between the parties can benefit all sides. Finally, we examine empirical evidence from a study of irrigation institutions in Nepal and discuss the broader practical significance of our findings.