Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America: Why Parties Conduct Rallies in Argentina

Abstract

Party brokers have information about voters’ political preferences and their likelihood of turning out to vote, and are able to target clientelistic inducements and monitor voter participation in exchange for voters’ electoral support. Yet, brokers may also use the clientelistic inducements they receive from party bosses to pursue their personal enrichment, at the cost of lost votes for their party. Why would brokers distribute party goods to voters? I argue that bosses force brokers to pursue the party’s electoral goals rather than their own material gain by distributing rewards and punishments based on their ability to turn out voters. Drawing on an original dataset that traces the political careers of 555 municipal candidates between 1995 and 2005, with field and archival research, participant observation, and over 100 in-depth interviews gathered during 24 months of fieldwork across precincts in Argentina, I show how bosses combine information from voter turnout at rallies and elections. I find that it is by comparing a broker’s ability to mobilize voters to rallies and elections that bosses are able to make better inferences about reliable brokers who will distribute party goods to voters, and unreliable brokers who will use party goods to pad their own pockets.