Relationality in Plato's Metaphysics: Reply to McPherran

Abstract

In a recent article, I advanced an interpretation of Treatment of Relational Statements in the Phaedo,1 and contested H-N. Castafieda's views on the same topic.2 Now Mark McPherran has argued that my attack on Casta?ieda is a failure and that my own views are seriously flawed.3 In this reply to McPherran I should like to re-examine the two opposing views mine and Castafieda's in the light of certain amplifications of the latter made by McPherran. I shall be particularly concerned here with the efficacy of each in explaining certain aspects of Plato's middle period theory of forms. Let me begin by repeating, very briefly, the two interpretations that we are concerned with of Plato's treatment of relational statements in the Phaedo: Castafieda: For every propositionally atomic sentence in the analysandum language containing n names the analysans will be a chain of n form-denoters. Thus Simmias is taller than Socrates, containing two names, will be analysed as Tall (Simmias) Short (Socrates). Matthen: Every propositionally simple statement about particulars in the analysandum language is concerned with some relation between particulars and a form. These relations, which we may call relations of participation, are expressed by the copula. However, the copula is ambiguous it may express