The importance of ‘Othering’ in China's national identity: Sino-Japanese relations as a stage of identity conflicts

Shogo Suzuki

The Pacific Review · 2007 · 112 citations · 62 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Chinese leadership leverages Japan’s imperial past for domestic bargaining, yet this view overlooks how deeply negative memories are embedded in China. The article argues that Japanese militaristic history is integral to Chinese national identity. It analyzes diverse Chinese primary sources, moving beyond elite‑centric IR explanations. The study finds that China’s national identity is framed by a victimhood narrative, with Japan as a key “Other” that reinforces this self‑image, and that this role emerges from China’s post‑Cold‑War quest for legitimacy, showing history shapes moral agency beyond elite manipulation.

Abstract

Abstract Recent studies have increasingly argued that the Chinese leadership uses Japan's imperialistic past as a tool for domestic and political bargaining. However, this argument fails to appreciate the embedded nature of negative memories within China. This article forwards an alternative argument by situating Japanese militaristic history within Chinese national identity. By examining a wide range of Chinese primary sources often underutilized by International Relations (IR) analysts, it moves beyond narrow, elite-centred explanations. The article argues that modern China's national identity has been characterized by an acute sense of ‘victimhood’ arising from its turbulent interactions with International Society, and that Japan plays an important role as an ‘Other’ which enhances China's self-image as a ‘victim’. Furthermore, it claims that Japan's emergence as an ‘Other’ in China's national identity is a by-product of China's attempts to regain its social and moral legitimacy within a post-Cold War International Society increasingly dominated by the Western powers. By highlighting the deeply entrenched nature of Japanese imperialist history in China's national identity, the article also shows that history is more than just part of a ‘toolkit’ that can be rationally utilized by the political elite, and that states are moral agents that are deeply affected by history.

References

62