European Finance Review · 2015 · 108 citations · 50 references
LawCorporate GovernanceFinanceBank RegulationBankingFinancial RegulationBank Corporate GovernanceBank GovernanceBanking RegulationBanking SupervisionBoard GovernanceBoard OversightBank Board StructureBank ConductBoard Governance EffectivenessBoard Monitoring Of ManagementBoard Monitoring RoleBoard Oversight ResponsibilitiesBoard Strategic OversightRegulatory Enforcement Mechanisms
Abstract We study regulatory enforcement actions issued against US banks to show that both board monitoring and advising are effective in preventing misconduct by banks. While better monitoring by boards prevents all categories of misconduct, better advising prevents misconduct of a technical nature. Board monitoring increases the likelihood that misconduct is detected, increases the penalties imposed on the CEO, and alleviates shareholder wealth losses following the detection of misconduct by regulators. Our article offers novel insights on how to structure bank boards to prevent bank misconduct.
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