Analysis · 2011 · 65 citations · 4 references
BusinessEconomicsBehavioral EconomicsDecision TheoryChoice Under UncertaintyDecision Under UncertaintyRational ChoiceRisk PreferencesEpistemic PermissibilityEpistemic Utility TheoryLottery Choice
Journal Article The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility Get access Thomas Kroedel Thomas Kroedel Humboldt University of Berlin Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany thomas.kroedel@hu-berlin.de Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Analysis, Volume 72, Issue 1, January 2012, Pages 57–60, https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anr129 Published: 07 November 2011
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<i>Epistemic Norms without Voluntary Control</i>
Philippe Chuard, Nicholas Southwood · Noûs · 2009 · 48 citations · Full text
THE LOTTERY PARADOX AND OUR EPISTEMIC GOAL
Igor Douven · Pacific philosophical quarterly · 2008 · 43 citations