1998 · 210 citations · 37 references
ComputingComputer ScienceComputer SecurityCryptographySecurity ProtocolsAuthentication ProtocolsNetwork ProtocolsProtocol AnalysisProtocol VerificationSecurity Protocol VerificationCommunication Protocol ModelingComputational Protocol AnalysisFormal Methods For Security ProtocolsProtocol State Analysis
We develop a framework for analyzing security protocols in which protocol adversaries may be arbitrary probabilistic polynomial-time processes. In this framework, protocols are written in a form of process calculus where security may be expressed in terms of observational equivalence, a standard relation from programming language theory that involves quantifying over possible environments that might interact with the protocol. Using an asymptotic notion of probabilistic equivalence, we relate observational equivalence to polynomial-time statistical tests and discuss some example protocols to illustrate the potential of this approach. 1 Introduction Protocols based on cryptographic primitives are commonly used to protect access to computer systems and to protect transactions over the internet. Two well-known examples are the Kerberos authentication scheme [15, 14], used to manage encrypted passwords, and the Secure Sockets Layer [12], used by internet browsers and servers to carry out...
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