Theory-Testing in Psychology and Physics: A Methodological Paradox

Paul E. Meehl

Philosophy of Science · 1967 · 992 citations · 10 references

Concepts

TL;DR

In physics, higher experimental precision tightens tolerance ranges and strengthens corroboration, whereas in psychology increased power raises the prior probability of finding a significant effect in the predicted direction, making statistical significance play a reverse logical role and exacerbating issues such as overemphasis on experimental cuteness and reliance on ad hoc explanations. The study finds that corroboration from successful experiments is weak and diminishes as precision increases.

Abstract

Because physical theories typically predict numerical values, an improvement in experimental precision reduces the tolerance range and hence increases corroborability. In most psychological research, improved power of a statistical design leads to a prior probability approaching ½ of finding a significant difference in the theoretically predicted direction. Hence the corroboration yielded by “success” is very weak, and becomes weaker with increased precision. “Statistical significance” plays a logical role in psychology precisely the reverse of its role in physics. This problem is worsened by certain unhealthy tendencies prevalent among psychologists, such as a premium placed on experimental “cuteness” and a free reliance upon ad hoc explanations to avoid refutation.

References

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