2003 · 111 citations · 17 references
ComputingComputer ScienceFormal MethodsProgramming LanguagesSafety EngineeringControl-flow AnalysisType CheckingType SystemsInformation Flow ControlInformation Flow StructureSecure Information FlowStatic Type CheckingType Safety
One way of enforcing an information flow control policy is to use a static type system capable of guaranteeing a noninterference property. Noninterference requires that two processes with distinct "high"-level components, but common "low"-level structure, cannot be distinguished by "low"-level observers. We state this property in terms of a rather strict notion of process equivalence, namely weak barbed reduction congruence. Because noninterference is not a safety property, it is often regarded as more difficult to establish than a conventional type safety result. This paper aims to provide an elementary noninterference proof in the setting of the /spl pi/-calculus. This is done by reducing the problem to subject reduction - a safety property - for a nonstandard, but fairly natural, extension of the /spl pi/-calculus, baptized the -calculus.
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Martı́n Abadi, Anindya Banerjee, Nevin Heintze et al. · 1999 · 415 citations
Secure information flow in a multi-threaded imperative language
Geoffrey Smith, Dennis Volpano · 1998 · 406 citations · Full text