The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp

TLDR

Empirical studies show that philosophical intuitions vary with cultural, educational, and socio‑economic factors, challenging their reliability as evidence. The study investigates Lehrer’s use of the Truetemp Case to argue against reliabilism. Intuitions about the Truetemp Case shift depending on the preceding thought experiment: participants who first see a clear knowledge case are less likely to attribute knowledge, while those who first see a clear non‑knowledge case are more likely, indicating instability that undermines its evidential value.

Abstract

A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio‐economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought‐experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case first, subjects first presented with a clear case of knowledge are less willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case, and subjects first presented with a clear case of non‐knowledge are more willing to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp Case. We contend that this instability undermines the supposed evidential status of these intuitions, such that philosophers who deal in intuitions can no longer rest comfortably in their armchairs.