The Reputational Basis of Public Accountability

TLDR

Accountability research faces two puzzles: a mismatch between principal–agent theory predictions and empirical evidence, and the widespread popularity of accountability measures that often produce opposite effects. The article proposes a reputation‑based framework to explain these puzzles, arguing that accountability is about managing reputation rather than merely reducing information asymmetries. In this view, accountability consists of cultivating a reputable image with audiences, conveying competent performance to generate reputational benefits.

Abstract

This article proposes a reputation‐based approach to account for two core puzzles of accountability. The first is the misfit between behavioral predictions of the hegemonic political science framework for talking about accountability, namely, principal–agent, and empirical findings. The second puzzle is the unrivaled popularity of accountability, given evidence that supposedly accountability‐enhancing measures often lead to opposite effects. A “reputation‐informed” theoretical approach to public accountability suggests that accountability is not about reducing informational asymmetries, containing “drift,” or ensuring that agents stay committed to the terms of their mandate. Accountability—in terms of both holding and giving—is about managing and cultivating one's reputation vis‐à‐vis different audiences. It is about being seen as a reputable actor in the eyes of one's audience(s), conveying the impression of competently performing one's (accountability) roles, thereby generating reputational benefits.