Journal of Accounting Research · 2013 · 248 citations · 32 references
BusinessEconomicsFinanceCorporate DisclosureFinancial EconomicsFinancial MarketsAsymmetric InformationDisclosureDisclosure TheoryInformation AsymmetryInformation EconomicsInformation RevelationDeterminants Of Firm ValueFirm Value EffectsInformation AcquisitionInformation Asymmetry EffectsInformation Disclosure IncentivesPrivate Information DisclosureSecondary Market DisclosureStock Market Liquidity
ABSTRACT Faceless trading in a secondary stock market not only redistributes wealth among investors but also generates information that feeds back to real decisions. Using this observation we re‐evaluate the “leveling‐the‐playing‐field” rationale for disclosure to secondary stock markets. By partially preempting traders' information advantage established from information acquisition, disclosure reduces private incentives to acquire information, resulting in two opposite effects on firm value. On one hand, this narrows the information gap between informed and uninformed traders and improves liquidity of firm shares. On the other hand, this reduces the informational feedback from the stock market to real decisions. This tradeoff determines the optimal disclosure policy. The model explains why firm value can be higher in an environment that simultaneously promotes disclosure and private information production and why growth firms are endogenously more opaque than value firms.
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Robert E. Verrecchia · Journal of Accounting and Economics · 1983 · 3.5K citations
Disclosure, Liquidity, and the Cost of Capital
Douglas W. Diamond, Robert E. Verrecchia · The Journal of Finance · 1991 · 3.5K citations
Information and the Cost of Capital
David Easley, Maureen O’Hara · The Journal of Finance · 2004 · 3.1K citations · Full text
Social Sciences, Economics, Finance +17
Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring
Bengt Holmström, Jean Tirole · Journal of Political Economy · 1993 · 1.8K citations