Annual Review of Financial Economics · 2015 · 236 citations · 95 references
BusinessCorporate GovernanceFinanceAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceFamily BusinessCorporate Governance MechanismsFamily Business GovernanceFamily Firm GovernanceFamily OwnershipOwnership StructureShareholder-manager ConflictsAgency Conflicts Between ShareholdersAgency In Family FirmsConflicts In Family FirmsFamily Business OwnershipFamily Firm Control StructuresFamily Firm Governance MechanismsFamily Governance StructureGovernance Mechanisms
We review what the financial economics literature has to say about the unique ways in which the following three classic agency problems manifest themselves in family firms: (a) shareholders versus managers, (b) controlling (family) shareholders versus noncontrolling shareholders, and (c) shareholders versus creditors. We also call attention to a fourth agency problem that is unique to family firms: the conflict of interest between family shareholders and the family at large, which can be thought of as the “superprincipal” in a multi-tier agency structure akin to those found in other concentrated ownership structures in which the controlling owner is the state, a bank, a corporation, or other institutions. We then discuss the solutions or corporate governance mechanisms that have been devised to address these problems and what research has taught us about these mechanisms' effectiveness at solving these four conflicts in family firms.
95
Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny · Journal of Political Economy · 1998 · 18.1K citations
Law, Corporate Governance, Finance +14
Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
Michael C. Jensen · American Economic Review · 1986 · 17.6K citations
Determinants of corporate borrowing
Stewart C. Myers · Journal of Financial Economics · 1977 · 13.4K citations
Corporate Ownership Around the World
Florencio López‐de‐Silanes, Andrei Shleifer · The Journal of Finance · 1999 · 10.7K citations · Full text