An analysis of the causes of corruption in the judiciary

Abstract

This report proposes improvements to the economic analysis of corrupt activities within the public sector, specifically within the judiciary. It provides a framework by which to analyze corruption by means of public perception, and an empirically verifiable approach to the study of corruption. The analysis also considers the private costs and benefits of state reforms as perceived by public officials. First-instance judges adjudicating commercial cases in Santiago, Chile and in Quito, Ecuador, during the period 1990-1996 are surveyed. This report finds that judicial reform necessarily includes legal, administrative, and organizational changes, yet the issue of corruption has not always been considered during the design of reform projects. For the system and processes to be more efficient, they must also be made more transparent and accountable. A corruption prevention plan can be developed by identifying the major functional areas of the organization, assessing and ranking the nature and extent of the risk in each area, and then assessing the probability of corruption. The procedures, systems, and controls can then be adapted to counter the identified risks, and will in turn help to engender the necessary trust in the system.